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Researchers typically assume that economic openness increases volatility. But the conventional empirical shorthand
for economic openness (trade as a share of overall income) fails to account for crucial distinctions in the way that
states trade. States that are deeply incorporated into the core of the international trading network have very differ-
ent experiences than states at the periphery with fewer, more marginalized trading partners. This article demon-
strates that a position at the core of the international trading system rather than the periphery actually diminishes
volatility. Thus, a country’s position in the world economy can, independently of its overall volume of trade, mod-
erate the risks of exposure to international markets. To demonstrate how this distinction might impact political
outcomes and future scholarship, we show that this reduction in volatility allows governments to minimize com-
pensation to their domestic publics.
As the tide of globalization has risen, many have ques-
tioned whether openness to international markets has
negative consequences.1 Global exposure may increase
economic volatility and with it the vulnerability of indi-
viduals to global market fluctuations (Prasad, Rogoff,
Wei, and Kose 2004). Others argue that global compe-
tition contributes to the erosion of social spending
and the welfare state as countries ‘‘race to the bot-
tom’’ to attract investment.2 These studies typically rely
on a simple shorthand for economic openness: the
sum of a country’s imports and exports as a share of
overall income.3 But the causal mechanisms underpin-
ning the notion that openness might have negative
consequences rest on more than the volume of traded
goods. Rather, many of the perceived dangers of glob-
alization relate to a country’s exposure to risk and its
relative position in the global trading system. At issue
is not just how much a country trades, but with whom.
In short, a country’s relational position in the world
economy colors its experience with globalization, and
these relations are best mapped and understood in
terms of trade networks rather than country-level
statistics.
This article demonstrates that the traditional mea-
sure of openness to trade misses a key dimension of
how states trade. First, it excludes diversification: States
with more trading partners are better insulated from
ordinary economic volatility than those with only a
few. However, diversification alone is not enough to
protect against volatility, because it fails to account for
the stability and significance of these trading partners.
Trade ties with countries that are connected to many
well-connected partners will contribute to relatively
greater stability because these countries are themselves
more insulated and diversified.
To illustrate, consider three countries: the first with
one isolated trading partner, the second with three
isolated trading partners, and the third with three
trading partners that in turn each have three trade
partners of their own. In the context of routine trade
volatility, the third country is more insulated than the
second state, which is more insulated than the first.
When combined with preferential attachment between
stable trading states, this results in a global trade net-
work that self-organizes into a more stable core and a
less stable periphery.4
1 The authors would like to thank Matt Baum, David Bearce, Bill Bern-
hard, Andrew Kerner, Ed Mansfield, Emilie Hafner-Burton, and Nita Rudra.
All errors are our own. Replication data and instructions are available from
the authors upon request.
2 See Oates (1972), Lee and Mckenzie (1989), and Andrews (1994). But
see Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) for an opposing view.
3 See, for example, Leamer (1988) and Dollar (1992). Birdsall and Hamo-
udi (2002) are more skeptical, noting that countries that export commodities
will have particularly high trade ⁄ GDP ratios but may not be open in other
respects.
4 The recent financial crisis has shifted attention from economic volatility
to major shocks. The lesson many have taken from this experience is that con-
nectedness and a position at the core of the international economic system is
not insulation but rather a liability. The idea here is that problems at the core
of the system can spread to the connected while sparing those at the periph-
ery. While seemingly contradictory, this is consistent with the argument that
we make here. Robustness in the face of routine volatility and vulnerability to
a major crisis at the core of the international system are in fact flip sides of
the same coin. In general, ‘‘hub and spokes’’ networks (which the interna-
tional trading system resembles in key regards) are robust to random disrup-
tion but susceptible to problems at the core.
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A relational approach to the implications of trade
adheres closely to the realities of the international eco-
nomic system, which is characterized by broad linkages
within the community of nations rather than just bilat-
eral ties. Consider the situation of many island
nations, which typically import far more than they
export, or export only a few goods, such as commodi-
ties, to a few countries. Such countries have relatively
high trade as a share of GDP but are peripheral to the
trade network. Unsurprisingly, such states are notably
vulnerable to shocks and volatility. By contrast, a coun-
try with significant trade relations with several coun-
tries that are themselves active in the global trade
network is more central and, under most circum-
stances, more insulated from volatility.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
The next section briefly reviews the relevant literature
on volatility and how states respond to it. The third
section discusses the theoretical and empirical advanta-
ges of network analysis as a tool for interpreting
aspects of globalization that are not captured by the
standard trade-to-GDP ratio. The fourth section dem-
onstrates that states that are tightly integrated into the
core of the international economic system suffer less
economic volatility in terms of abnormal swings in
income, output, consumption, and investment. To
illustrate the impact of this change, we then demon-
strate a relationship between network position and
government spending, which we attribute to reduced
volatility leaving governments free to pursue the com-
petitive benefits of trade in lieu of compensating
domestic publics. The final section concludes.
Openness, Volatility, and Vulnerability
In classical Ricardian trade theory, openness to trade
allows countries to specialize in goods in which they
have comparative advantage, thereby increasing wel-
fare for all participating countries. Empirically, cross-
national studies show a strong and positive relation-
ship between a country’s level of trade and its eco-
nomic growth, as well as between open markets and
growth.5 However, at least in the classical model, eco-
nomic growth through trade comes at a price. These
models imply that the competitive pressure of free
trade will crowd out the welfare function of the state
because the movement of factors should, through fac-
tor price equalization, lead to competition that under-
mines government spending. This apparent tension
between optimal economic growth and the welfare
function of the state is one of the central flashpoints
of the debate on globalization.6
Despite the intuitive appeal of the ‘‘race to the bot-
tom’’ argument, empirical evidence indicates that gov-
ernment spending, at least in the developed world,
has actually increased with the rise of globalization
and trade openness. This observation gives rise to the
compensation hypothesis; that is, that governments
seeking to maintain a hold-on power will redistribute
some of the gains from trade toward greater welfare
spending. A significant body of empirical research
grapples with this apparent contradiction, hoping to
gain purchase with disaggregated measures of spend-
ing and globalization (Dreher et al. 2008) or by intro-
ducing previously omitted variables, such as structural
changes in a country’s economy that might be driving
the process (Iversen and Cusack 2000). Taking a some-
what different tack, Rodrik argues that the missing
link in the research on globalization and government
spending is the relationship between openness and
increased volatility (Rodrik 1997, 1998). Shocks in the
global economy can throw countries with open mar-
kets into temporary disequilibrium, forcing govern-
ments to spend more abundantly in order to cushion
the blow to their populations. Bolstering this argu-
ment, Kim demonstrates empirically that openness
alone has less impact on government spending than
external risk (Kim 2007).
However, the majority of the empirical studies hinge
on a fundamental simplification—and, we argue, a
misspecification—of the nature of openness. Policy-
makers and scholars have widely assumed that open-
ness works in a consistent way, and accordingly, these
studies operationalize openness in trade as a share of
GDP. But all types of openness are not equivalent. At
a given ratio of trade to GDP, it seems intuitive that
reliance on trade partners that are themselves deeply
integrated into the trade system provides a stable foun-
dation, insulating a country from economic shocks in
any one country in particular. The point is that the
commonly used measure of total trade ⁄ GDP identifies
an attribute of an individual state, but the meaning of
openness and the origins of volatility are equally con-
tingent on relations with other states, and we need
measures of openness that incorporate this relational
aspect of the economic system.
If the advantages of stable, diversified partners are
widely recognized by states, this will result in a pattern
of preferential attachment that will give rise to an
international trading network with a core ⁄ periphery
structure. States with connections will find it relatively
easy to forge ties with other well-connected states.
Those with less enviable positions are less attractive
partners and will therefore find this process more diffi-
cult. Thus, connections at the connected center
tighten, while the links at the periphery remain dif-
fuse.
The implication of this logic is an expectation about
volatility that is based on a state’s place in the interna-
tional trading network rather than exclusively on its
individual behavior. If a country trades heavily with
partners that are themselves important in the interna-
tional trading system, it will translate into a position at
the core of the trade network. Frequent interactions
with several strong economies can insulate a country
from an economic shock originating in one particular
state—which could be damaging if that country were
chained to a relatively small number of peripheral
5 The literature is too expansive to summarize in its entirety. On the mer-
its of open trade, see Krueger (1998); see Edwards (1993) and Alesina, Spolo-
are, and Wacziarg (2003) on trade and growth in developing countries. There
is also, however, a non-trivial amount of work that finds no relationship
between trade and growth. See Edwards (1998); Rodriguez and Rodrik
(2000); Dollar and Kraay (2001).
6 Dreher, Sturm, and Ursprung (2008) provide a good summary of the
current state of theoretical and empirical advances on this topic. The banner
studies include, among others, Hicks and Swank (1992); Garrett (1995, 1998);
Garrett and Mitchell (1997); Quinn (1997); and Rudra (2002, 2004).
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trading partners. A country’s position in the trade net-
work, then, could be an important precondition for
stability as countries integrate their economies interna-
tionally. If countries open up to the global economy
with asymmetric relationships, relying too heavily on
one trading partner or on several partners that are
peripheral to the core of the system, they are left
exposed to short-term fluctuations that may increase
volatility.7
Take, for example, the postcommunist countries of
Eastern Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991, many of these countries were faced with the
choice of keeping their established trade ties with the
former Soviet Union or directing trade toward the
European Union. Even though the number of trading
partners would have been higher in the East, most of
the Central European countries chose to direct their
trade toward Germany and France because, in addition
to being richer countries, they were much more cen-
tral to the European and global trading networks and
correspondingly more stable. Here, fewer but better
linked trading partners were more valuable than a
multitude of peripheral ones.
Thinking about Trade Relationally
It is appropriate to consider trade openness in terms
of networks in part because of the nature of the data
itself. There are two sorts of data relevant to this dis-
cussion: attribute data and relational data. Attribute
data describes the qualities of agents (states, in the
present discussion)—GDP, population, and oil produc-
tion, for example. Standard statistical techniques are
designed to uncover relationships in such data. How-
ever, a great deal of data in political science, including
most data with which we might operationalize aspects
of globalization such as trade, is relational data—the
contacts, ties, connections, and transfers between
agents that cannot be cleanly reduced to properties of
the agents themselves because they describe their
interactions (Scott 1991).
Consider the trade data commonly used in measures
of economic openness. When researchers assign
imports to states, they are effectively taking a flow,
thought of graphically as a line (or ‘‘edge’’) between
two states (or ‘‘nodes’’) and artificially reducing it to
an attribute of a state. Not only does this limit the
analysis to counting only imports or exports and dis-
carding the other in order to avoid redundancy, but it
also obscures the fact that an import into one country
is an export from another. It would be far better to
consider a broader network of trade, which can map
the flow of exchange through the entire international
system. A state that is more central to a network of
countries is embedded in a complex web of existing as
well as potential relationships, different from the bilat-
eral ties explored in most models of trade and eco-
nomic growth (Lazer 2003).
Relational analysis has gained traction in many areas
of international relations.8 Part of the reason that net-
work theory has been influential is because it offers an
array of developed and readily accessible tools with
which to explore the broader structure of the relation-
ships between actors. Measures of network centrality
provide a simple way to characterize the relational
importance of each state in a matrix of relationships
and therefore serve as a useful empirical approxima-
tion of the relative integration of a state into the glob-
alized international system. Centrality measures
evaluate the location and prominence of actors or
nodes in the network based on network position alone
and can therefore be thought of as a structural attri-
bute of the nodes in a network. Thus, centrality mea-
sures can add relational elements into a standard
statistical model. It is therefore possible to retain some
measure of comparability with existing findings while
capturing the deeper interrelationships between the
node and the broader network.
We use two measures of centrality to operationalize
key independent variables: degree centrality to capture
simple diversification and eigenvector centrality to
identify whether a state is at the core or periphery of
the international trading system. Degree centrality sim-
ply counts the number of trading connections that a
node has in a network. In the context of the interna-
tional trading system, this is the number of states with
which a given state maintains significant trading rela-
tionships.9 More in-depth discussion of the eigenvector
measure is warranted, as both the measure itself and
the underlying phenomenon that we seek to character-
ize are more complex.10
Eigenvector centrality assesses the importance of a
node by considering the importance of its neighbors.
The measure is commonly used to characterize pres-
tige and power, but it can also describe prominence in
the trading system that we are attempting to identify.
The central concept, developed by Alexander (1963)
and further developed by others (Bonacich 1972), is
that the relevant issue is not just how many partners a
given state has, but also how many partners these
states have in their own right. The extension of this
logic to trade and volatility is relatively clear. A state
with deep trade ties to the core of the network (high
eigenvector centrality) is more likely to be insulated
from volatility than one that is not—even if the second
country has a relatively high number of first-degree
trading partners.
This measure is described in equation 1, which pro-
duces a system of equations (since the definition is
7 It is possible that diversification may not have this proposed positive
effect for exporters of a single commodity that is priced in an international
market; oil, for example. However, this situation would introduce conservative
bias into the empirical analyses that follow.
8 See Marin and Mayntz (1992); Marsh and Rhodes (1992); Huckfeldt,
Beck, Dalton, and Levine (1995); Mintrom and Vergari (1998); and Fowler
(2006). For a much more complete discussion of the burgeoning use of net-
works in international relations, see Kahler (2009) and Hafner-Burton, Kahler,
and Montgomery (2009). For applications, see Hafner-Burton and Montgom-
ery (2006) and von Stein (2008).
9 In the analysis that follows, we adhere to past practice and treat 4% of
GDP of the joint GDP of the dyad as the threshold for significance (Kali and
Reyes 2006). The findings are robust for thresholds ranging from 2% to 8%
of GDP.
10 There are other measures of centrality: for example, closeness and
betweenness (Freeman 1979). This analysis focuses on degree and eigenvector
centrality because we argue that they most immediately operationalize the
objects of core theoretical interest.
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explicitly self-referential) from which we derive an
adapted measure of eigenvector centrality for each
state in the international system for each year in our
period of analysis (1976–2001). The eigenvector cen-
trality of a state derives from the sum of the eigenvec-
tor centralities of those states with which it has a first-
degree link:
kCei ðg Þ ¼ Rj gij Cej ðg Þ ð1Þ
In matrix notation:
kCeðg Þ ¼ gCeðg Þ ð2Þ
where k is a proportionality factor. The result is that
Ce(g) is an eigenvector of g, and k is its eigenvalue
(Jackson 2008).
This measure simultaneously accounts for the over-
all volume or magnitude of the international interac-
tion, as well as the number and importance of
partners. If no one trades with a country, then that
country is not central to the network. More signifi-
cantly, if only peripheral, unconnected countries trade
with a country, then it is also relatively isolated from
the core of the system. However, if a state trades
widely with central states in the system, then that state
will also rate highly in eigenvector centrality. Thus, the
eigenvector centrality of a state in the international
system maps closely to the core ⁄ periphery distinction
because it is determined by a reciprocal system of
equations that describe the relative importance of the
states to which it is connected.
Research Design and Findings
Our first task is to demonstrate the relationships
between diversification and eigenvector centrality in
international trading networks and economic volatility.
We begin by calculating the eigenvector centrality of
each state using Gleditsch’s expanded data on dyadic
trade among countries (Gleditsch 2002). Using the
same data, we also estimate the diversification of trade
partners by simply counting the number of significant
trading partners (that is, those with which trade
exceeds 4% of GDP, as discussed in footnote 9).
Those countries that rank relatively low in eigenvec-
tor trade centrality are generally in Africa and Central
Asia. Unsurprisingly, the OECD countries are at the
top of the list for eigenvector centrality as well as for
the traditional measure of trade openness. However,
these measures do not generally move together.11 For
example, unlike in the OECD countries—which trade
frequently and have many central trading partners—in
Latin America, there is not a single instance where a
country is high in both, meaning that the countries
that are most central to the global trade network are
not necessarily the countries that have a high trade-to-
GDP ratio. To take another example, the United Arab
Emirates scores lower on trade centrality than coun-
tries that trade considerably less overall. This illustrates
not only the deceptive weight that trade in commodi-
ties can introduce when examining trade alone, but
also the importance of a country’s trading partners;
the United Arab Emirates’ are Japan, South Korea,
India, Thailand, and China, who themselves do not
rank in the very top in terms of trade centrality.
We pit the eigenvector measure against the standard
operationalization that we have already described: total
trade as a share of GDP (trade). We calculate economic
volatility by taking the natural log of the difference in
the variable in question and then the square root of
the 5-year moving average, multiplying that quantity by
the square root of the number of years in the sample
(25 years, for our primary specifications). We calculate
volatility on five commonly used variables: output
(logged GDP per capita), income (GNI per capita), final
consumption, household final consumption, and
investment as a share of GDP (Kim 2007; Mansfield
and Reinhardt 2008). All economic data come from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
We turn to the key independent variables from the
literature on volatility in economics and political sci-
ence to identify the factors that we must control for
(Kim 2007). Volatility has been shown to be a function
of aggregate output (GDP), logged to normalize the
distribution (we omit these variables for the estima-
tions where volatility in GDP and GNI are the depen-
dent variables); the size of a country (population),
according to several scholars (Down 2007; Furceri and
Ribeiro 2008); a government’s ability to make deci-
sions without constraint (constraints, operationalized
here as political constraints index created by Henisz
(2007)); the level of democracy in a country, which
further shows how insulated politicians are from the
electorate (democracy, expressed through Polity scores);
the level of inflation; the stock of money in the econ-
omy (M2 ⁄ GDP); the volatility of terms of trade; and capi-
tal openness (the 12-point scale created by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004)). Economic variables were gathered
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Pooled time-series data sets such as this one violate
the Gauss–Markov assumptions for linear estimation.
The presence of relationships within countries and in
particular time periods means that there will be serial
correlation between observations, as well as structure
in the error terms. Though there are many potential
solutions to the problem, no one method will work for
all types of data (Beck and Katz 1995; Wilson and But-
ler, unpub. data). To correct for serial correlation
while avoiding the downward bias caused by including
lagged dependent variables, our main specifications
employ Prais–Winsten transformations, which assume
an autoregressive moving-average process (Achen
2000). We also include panel-corrected standard errors
to correct for unit effects.
Since listwise deletion can lead to biased coefficients
as well as to inefficient estimations, we used Amelia to
impute values for the missing observations (Honaker,
King, and Blackwell 2007). The estimations below
reflect estimations across five imputed data sets.
Because our centrality measure is based on dyadic
trade measures that only extend until 2000 and
because many developing countries had extreme miss-
ingness on variables in the 1960s and early 1970s, we
11 Some might be concerned that the overlap between the diversification
and eigenvector centrality measures will lead to problems with multicollineari-
ty in the models that follow. However, the collinearity between the measures
is only 0.34. Furthermore, the variance inflation factor is well under 2.0, indi-
cating that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a serious issue in this instance.
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limited the imputations from 1976 to 2001.12 To limit
the problem of endogeneity—that is, the possibility
that positive economic outcomes are driving our mea-
sures of centrality in the network—we lag both central-
ity measures by 1 year.
We begin with models that test the relationship
between openness (trade ⁄ GDP), diversification, and
eigenvector centrality on the one hand and volatility
on the other. Table 1 presents the results of the full
model specifications for all five measures of volatility,
as described above: output (GDP), income (GNI), con-
sumption, household final consumption, and invest-
ment as a share of GDP.
Consistent with the results of other studies in which
the coefficient on trade is significant, the direction is
generally positive, indicating that as trade openness
increases so too does volatility (Kim 2007). However,
the relationship with the trade ⁄ GDP measure is not
consistent across all five measures of volatility.13
Eigenvector trade centrality has statistically signifi-
cant and negative effects on volatility in all five mod-
els. In contrast, the simple measure of diversification
appears to have no discernible effect on any of the vol-
atility measures. The results indicate that the way in
which one measures openness to trade is important.
While trade openness may, on average, contribute to
volatility, a country’s position in the global trading net-
work can actually serve to mitigate that volatility in a
substantively important way.
As a further illustration, Figure 1 plots these pre-
dicted values for changes in trade as a share of GDP as
well as trade centrality, across changes varying from
two standard deviations away from the mean in both
directions.
It is easy to see that eigenvector centrality has persis-
tent negative and substantively significant effects on vol-
atility. These effects are relatively muted for household
final consumption but are particularly strong for our
other variables of interest, with decreases in volatility of
nearly a full percentage point.
The substantive effects of eigenvector centrality in
the trade network are not only more consistent in
their decreases on volatility (the signs are always
negative), but the magnitude of those effects are
greater than for either trade as a share of GDP or of
diversification. These effects are particularly strong for
consumption. Moving from a mean level of centrality
(for example, the average across the given time period
for Guatemala) up one standard deviation (effectively,
up to the position of Ireland in the international trad-
ing network) reduces consumption volatility by nearly
15%.
We performed several robustness checks to test the
durability of the findings. First, we ran the models for
the original data set, prior to using multiple imputa-
tion. Despite the smaller number of observations and
somewhat larger standard errors, the results were con-
sistent with those presented here. Second, we ran Ame-
lia to extend to a broader time span—from 1960 to
2007. The coefficients of interest remained unaffected,
though the standard errors increased somewhat—a tes-
tament to the larger degree of missingness in those
years, since the imputation algorithms produce noise
in the presence of too few observations. Additionally,
we ran the specifications using fixed effects for region,
as well as individual fixed effects for country and year,
which achieved largely similar results.
Volatility and Compensation
To underline the significance of the proposed alter-
ation to the way that we think about the relationship
between openness to trade and volatility, we turn
to government spending and the compensation
hypothesis.
As we noted in the introduction, as globalization has
risen, it has been argued either that openness could
force reductions in welfare provision due to the rise of
TABLE 1. Effects of Eigenvector Centrality on Volatility
GDP GNI Consumption Household consumption Investment
Constant 1.92 (0.32)*** 2.26 (0.31)*** 1.73 (0.31)*** 1.34 (0.38)*** 3.23 (0.42)***
GDP – – 0.05 (0.04) )0.02 (0.006) *** )0.05 (0.04)
Population )0.25 (0.08)*** )0.29 (0.13)*** )0.17 (0.06)*** )0.12 (0.01)*** )0.12 (0.06)**
Constraints )0.10 (0.07) )0.06 (0.07) )0.18 (0.08)*** )0.01 (0.008)*** )0.10 (0.05)***
Inflation 0.0001 (0.00)*** 0.0001 (0.00)*** 0.0001 (0.0001)*** 0.0001 (0.00)*** 0.0001 (0.00)***
Money supply )0.003 (0.001)*** )0.003 (0.001)*** )0.0009 (0.002) )0.0003 (0.0001)*** 0.0006 (0.0009)
Terms of trade 0.06 (0.03) 0.10 (0.03)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** 0.006 (0.003)** )0.03 (0.02)
Capital openness )0.02 (0.03) 0.008 (0.02) )0.06 (0.03)** )0.003 (0.002) 0.03 (0.02)
Trade )0.0004 (0.001) )0.002 (0.001)* 0.004 (0.002)** 0.0002 (0.0001)** )0.0008 (0.001)
Diversification )0.0008 (0.002) )0.0005 (0.002) )0.0012 (0.002) )0.0007 (0.0002) 0.003 (0.002)
Eigen vector centrality )0.23 (0.08)*** )0.23 (0.08)*** )0.28 (0.10)*** )0.03 (0.009)*** )0.10 (0.05)**
N 5004 4601 3080 4381 5322
q .78 .74 .74 .70 .85
Wald v2 18.53 56.01 22.96 47.84 10.72
q > v2 .04 .06 .05 .00 .38
R2 .03 .06 .05 .13 .04
(Notes. Coefficients are derived from Prais–Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Estimation coefficients and statistics are aver-
aged across five data sets; panel-corrected standard errors are a function of the variance within and across data sets.
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.)
12 Missingness for the variables in question was around 30%. The final
estimations represent average coefficients across all five data sets, with the
standard errors reflecting the within- as well as the between-data set variation.
13 This inconsistency is possibly due to the fact that we have reduced
Kim’s period of analysis (1950–2002) to 1976–2001.
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competition or that exposure to volatility could force
governments to provide compensation in return for the
destabilization and displacement suffered by their citi-
zens. However, if countries at the core of the trade net-
work experience decreased volatility, their governments
would be relatively free from the obligation to compen-
sate, and international competitive pressures might in
turn lead to drops in welfare spending, as suggested in
the literature.14
As a preliminary probe of this issue, our final task is
to demonstrate the relationship between eigenvector
centrality and government spending.15 Table 2 shows
the results of three models that include parameters
from several well-known specifications of the determi-
nants of welfare spending, including the age depen-
dency ratio (that is, the ratio of the combined
population of children (0–14 years) and the elderly
population (65 years and over)—persons in the
‘‘dependent’’ ages—to every 100 people); the level of
output (GDP in constant US dollars); the level of
democracy (polity scores); the percent of the popula-
tion that lives in urban areas; and value added in man-
ufacturing as well as in agriculture (Iversen and
Cusack 2000; Rudra 2002). The findings are similar if
the GDP and population variables are replaced with a
single measure of GDP per capita. We also include our
measure of eigenvector trade centrality, the diversifica-
tion measure, and the standard trade ⁄ GDP measure.
Model A includes just the standard measure of trade,
Model B adds the diversification measure, and Model
C incorporates the eigenvector measure.
The measure of eigenvector centrality in the interna-
tional trade network is associated with statistically signif-
icant decreases in government spending, while the
traditional total trade ⁄ GDP measure is positive. This
indicates that operationalizing openness and exposure
as a country’s eigenvector centrality in the international
trade network produces very different results than sim-
ply measuring trade as a share of GDP. Figure 2, which
graphs the expected values for eigenvector indicator,
provides a sense of the magnitude of the effect.
Although trade openness has a positive relationship
with government spending, those changes are
swamped in magnitude by the decreases in spending
associated with trade centrality. Thus, for every dollar
spent as compensation for an increase in trade as a
share of output, a proportional increase in eigenvector
centrality trade means a drop in spending of 88 cents.
This suggests that countries hoping to maintain their
competitive edge in the international system might
consider not only the volume of trade, but a focus on
acquiring varied trading partners who are themselves
central to the network.
Conclusion
We hope to have expanded on the ongoing debate on
the effects of globalization in two ways. First, we have
demonstrated that broad connections to the interna-
tional system, or deep connections with particularly
important states in the international system, appear to
be a key indicator of the degree of volatility that a
national economy will likely suffer. Those types of con-
nections are more important than simply having a rel-
atively high number of trading partners. Thought of
differently, this finding suggests that the core of the
international economic system is considerably more
insulated from volatility than is the periphery. If eigen-
vector centrality in the trade network is shown to
decrease volatility, this illuminates the finding that a
country’s position in the trade network can lead to
drops in welfare spending. When countries are open
but are not forced to shield their citizens from the ill
effects of volatility, international competitive pressures
may in turn promote decreases in welfare spending.
More work could potentially be done to uncover the
microfoundations of the mechanisms that link central-
ity to volatility, and indeed volatility to spending, but
these results indicate that important links exist
between those phenomena.
Additionally, we have empirically demonstrated the
existence of a plausible causal mechanism that links
globalization and the welfare state. By showing that
centrality to the trade network decreases volatility,
which in turn decreases government spending, we
have delineated an important step in the process by
which openness impacts national governments and the
public. If countries at the core of the international
trading system are more insulated from volatility, their
governments can forego compensation, and welfare
states face the erosion of competitive pressures. Future
work might examine in greater detail the links
FIG 1. Effects of Eigenvector Centrality on Volatility. All Estimates
Significant at the p < .05 level
14 There are many complex mediating links between compensation and
openness to trade, no matter how the latter is measured. For example, interest
groups, government partisanship, political representation, and a country’s eco-
nomic structure all have been hypothesized to underlie this relationship. Delin-
eating those links precisely is beyond the scope of this article; we wish instead to
establish empirically that the fundamental relationship between compensation
and openness is a function of how the latter concept is theorized and that that
theory has measurement implications.
15 Rodrik and others also use total public spending as a share of GDP as a
dependent variable, but it should be noted that many national budgets are
not primarily aimed at compensation. We maintain the established research
design to aid comparison, but future work could consider more specific
spending on social security and welfare.
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between decreased volatility, pressure from interest
groups, and government policy.
This study also has implications for the susceptibility
of states to contagion of economic crises. The empirical
evidence presented here does not immediately address
the origins of financial crises, speaking instead to more
standard types of economic volatility. However, the well-
developed literature on network structure and robust-
ness suggests that the network of relationships may be
equally important in financial crises, but that the rela-
tionship between connectedness and volatility would
work in precisely the opposite way. States that are linked
to the core of a centralized network are likely insulated
from typical volatility, but they may also be more suscep-
tible to major shocks and crises that originate in the
core of that system. As we noted in the introduction,
centralized networks are robust in the sense that a smal-
ler number of important nodes have a disproportionate
number of connections and therefore insulation from
disturbances at the periphery. But centralized networks
are also subject to catastrophic collapse because many
nodes rely on those at the core of the system—should
something happen to that core, then the effects will rap-
idly diffuse throughout the network.
This implication of the connectedness puzzle is a
prime area for future work. Such research might
explore the consequences of the network location of
the origins of shocks, including the magnitude of
shocks between the core and the periphery of trading
networks. Being peripheral may raise the aggregate
vulnerability of an economy to shocks, but if being at
the core results in less frequent but more significant
shocks, then it is unclear which position is preferable
when it comes to volatility. Similarly, an analysis of
structural equivalence and other measures of centrality
such as betweenness centrality could shed further
insight. Such analyses could clarify whether states with
structurally similar positions (beyond centrality) in the
network have similar experiences with volatility.
We hope to have demonstrated that the terms on
which a country integrates into the international trade
network can have important effects on a country’s sta-
bility and its need to cushion its domestic publics from
international pressures. This finding is an important
component of the consequences of openness.
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